Pay for performance: Australian landscape, international efforts, and impact on practice by Masters, Stacey Cynthia & Brown, Lynsey
Keep up to date with 
new Australian primary 
health care research 
ISSN 1839-6348 
Issue 47 
June 2016 
Stacey Masters 
Lynsey Brown 
    Pay for performance: Australian  
    landscape, international efforts, 
    and impact on practice  
Fee-for-service (FFS) funding continues to dominate primary health care in Australia 
despite calls for reform. FFS, where providers bill for each service they provide, rewards 
increased activity. This may lead to over-servicing, increased costs (with no controls on 
prices charged), and negative impacts on quality of care. In contrast, pay-for-
performance (P4P) approaches refer to payments to general practitioners (GPs) or 
practices, according to the number of times a certain standard of performance is met, 
and have been shown to improve quality.1; 2 Blended funding models have been trialled 
in Australia, with the 2011-14 Diabetes Care Project (DCP) incorporating P4P and 
flexible funding, while retaining FFS components. This RESEARCH ROUNDup will 
examine P4P in the Australian primary health care context and provide lessons from 
both systematic reviews and international experiences of P4P in primary health care.  
significant improvement in glycaemic control (HbA1c), blood 
pressure, blood lipids, waist circumference and depression, 
compared with participants in the control group. However,  
cost-effectiveness of the model was not established in the  
18 month trial, or with extrapolation of benefits and costs over 
an extended period.8  
Lessons from systematic reviews 
Several systematic reviews have examined the impact and 
effectiveness of P4P and reported mixed effects.9-15 In general, 
reviews have raised concerns about the quality of the included 
studies, including difficulty disentangling the effect of P4P from 
other quality improvement initiatives, and selection bias (e.g. if 
people with multimorbidity were excluded, does this lead to over 
or under-estimates of effect?).9 Evidence of unintended 
consequences has also been reported, including less attention to 
care processes that were not incentivised.14 Design elements, 
including performance targets that are achievable and easy to 
track; strong infrastructure; alignment with organisational goals; 
and public reporting have been identified as contributing to 
positive effects.13; 14  
Lessons from international 
experiences 
P4P was implemented as part of the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) in the UK and is used by public and private 
health insurers in the US. P4P is also part of the US Patient 
Centered Medical Home model. In general, most developed 
countries use a combination of P4P, FFS, capitation or salaries 
(i.e. blended payments) to compensate for weaknesses 
associated with single payment approaches.16 The UK experience 
of the QOF has relevance for Australia as it represents a  
system-wide reform that incentivises GPs to meet specific 
outcomes related to clinical targets (covering a comprehensive 
list of chronic conditions) as well as organisational quality 
indicators.17 Evidence-based indicators were developed by the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence17 and adjusted 
through negotiation with the relevant GP body.4 Twenty per cent 
Australian experience of P4P 
P4P aims to encourage practitioners to provide better quality 
care. Such incentives define performance in terms of reaching a 
minimum threshold for quality of care provided; including the 
way treatments are provided as well as improvements in clinical 
measures related to health outcomes.2 Australia’s first 
experiments with P4P began in 1999 with the introduction of 
(voluntary) Practice Incentive Payments (PIP) and Service 
Incentive Payments (SIP) to improve the quality of care for 
groups at risk of poor health outcomes (Indigenous Australians 
and those with asthma, diabetes or mental health conditions) as 
well as rates of cervical cancer screening. The PIP include 
infrastructure payments (e.g. for becoming a teaching practice) 
and sign-on payments for having registers in place; while the SIPs 
are related to specific conditions.3 For example, GPs receive PIP 
for each person with diabetes or moderate-to-severe asthma 
they ‘sign on’ to a programme of care; and an annual SIP for each 
completed ‘cycle of care’. Practices can claim an additional 
payment if they complete cycles of care for at least 20% of their 
patients with diabetes.4  
As with other P4P schemes, PIP and SIP are used as levers to 
effect change in general practice. Examples include a PIP after-
hours incentive that was introduced in July 2015; and from  
1 May 2016, new eligibility requirements for eHealth PIP 
payments require GPs to upload a minimum number of shared 
health summaries to My Health Record.5 However, a recent 
review identified serious limitations in the current incentive 
payments, including: high administrative burden; non-specified 
performance outcomes; payments not adjusted for patient age, 
risk factors, more advanced disease or comorbidity; and 
payments not well targeted to the complexity and intensity of 
services that are required.4; 6 
The DCP was a multi-centre cluster randomised trial that 
incorporated P4P as part of a comprehensive intervention to 
improve glycaemic control in patients with diabetes. Practices in 
one arm of the trial received quarterly payments and flexible 
funding for allied health (based on risk stratification) as well as 
funds for care facilitation and quality improvement support 
payments (QISP).7; 8 Participants in this arm showed a statistically 
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of indicators relate to medications (e.g. influenza immunisation 
for patients with diabetes and other conditions) and other 
indicators require drug treatment in order to meet targets (e.g. 
blood pressure targets).18 As a result, the QOF has led to 
increased prescription rates for antidepressants, statins and 
other drugs.17 Similarly, the Australian DCP evaluation reported 
that Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and National Diabetes 
Services Scheme costs rose by $158 per person per annum as a 
result of changes in prescribing behaviour during the trial.8 In the 
US, attention has turned to the alignment of P4P incentives with 
expected health gain19 and value-based payments that aim to 
reduce spending while improving quality and outcomes 
(accountability for cost).20 
As a system-wide initiative, the QOF underscores the importance 
of standardised approaches for reporting activity and outcomes 
in general practice.21 As part of the Australian Primary Health 
Care Advisory Group’s recent proposal for Health Care Homes, 
the development of a national minimum dataset for primary 
health care, as well as automated extraction of de-identified 
information from clinical software programmes, has been 
recommended.8 Addressing professional and organisational 
barriers to information sharing as well as investment in both a 
wider quality improvement programme and the technology to 
rapidly feedback performance to providers are required.21; 22  
Linking P4P to achieving clinical targets (such as HbA1c) raises 
equity concerns. Socioeconomic factors such as out-of-pocket 
costs for prescriptions and tests may impact on treatment 
compliance and thus performance metrics and payments. GPs 
may also be reluctant to enrol patients with advanced or 
comorbid disease, unless P4P recognises the additional time and 
resources needed for these patients, as well as improvements in 
clinical measures. For example, the DCP included risk-adjusted 
payments to ensure that patients with the highest levels of need 
would not be excluded from participation and tracked 
improvement in glycaemic control rather than achievement 
against a specific target.8 In addition, the QISP included a balance 
of process of care indicators, clinical outcomes and patient 
experience, to recognise that patient factors as well as quality of 
care, influence clinical indicators.7 
Conclusion 
Australia has adopted a cautious approach to P4P, drawing on 
lessons from the international experience of P4P and 
circumventing some of the problems commonly cited in relation 
to P4P. While the evidence for the cost-effectiveness of P4P 
remains equivocal, Australia is contributing to the development 
of comprehensive models of care to improve quality and 
outcomes in primary health care. 
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